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ARTICLE I SECTION 13 OF THE VIRGINIA
CONSTITUTION: OF MILITIAS AND AN INDIVIDUAL
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
The Honorable Stephen R. McCullough *
INTRODUCTION
The scope of legislative authority to regulate firearms remains
a subject of fierce debate, including in the General Assembly of
Virginia. On an annual basis, members of the General Assembly
propose a wide range of measures to either restrict or expand the
ability of citizens to own, carry, or use firearms.! Debates about
the right to keep and bear arms ordinarily center on the Second
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the United
States Supreme Court's landmark District of Columbia v. Heller
decision.2 In Heller, a bare 5-4 majority of the Court rejected the
"collective" right theory and held that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to possess a firearm.'
Virginia's own constitution contains a clause analogous to the
Second Amendment: article I, section 13 ("the Clause").! In the
* Judge, Court of Appeals of Virginia. J.D., 1997, University of Richmond School of
Law; B.A., 1994, University of Virginia. The views expressed in this article represent
strictly the personal views of the author.
1. See, e.g., S.B. 965, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2013) (making it a crime to fail
to report a stolen gun); H.B. 2207, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2013) (prohibiting the
sale of "assault firearm[s]"); H.B. 1557, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2013) (calling for
the establishment of training standards to allow certain persons to bring a concealed
handgun into a school).
2. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
3. Id. at 595.
4. VA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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wake of Heller, it might be tempting to conclude that article I,
section 13 has been relegated to the status of museum piece-an
item of interest to historians perhaps, but one that no longer re-
tains any contemporary relevance. Such a characterization would
be premature. First, given the narrowness of the Heller decision,
as well as the United States Supreme Court's current lack of con-
cern for stare decisis, it is not clear whether the Supreme Court
will continue to adhere to an individual rights interpretation.
Second, even if an individual rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment survives over the long term, later jurisprudential
developments may significantly restrict judicial review of legisla-
tion regulating firearms. For example, the United States Su-
preme Court has yet to resolve the degree of scrutiny the courts
should apply when reviewing Second Amendment-based chal-
lenges.' If the United States Supreme Court adopts a deferential
standard, proponents of the right to bear arms may turn to article
I, section 13 of the Virginia Constitution to challenge firearm
regulations adopted by the General Assembly or the Common-
wealth's administrative agencies. Finally, recent tragedies have
prompted renewed calls for stricter gun regulation. Although the
present composition of the Virginia General Assembly makes it
unlikely that our legislature will adopt strict gun control
measures in the near term, Virginia's political outlook continues
to evolve-as evidenced by the Old Dominion's back-to-back
award of its electoral votes to President Obama.
This article endeavors to determine whether, like the Second
Amendment, article I, section 13 recognizes an individual right to
bear arms and, therefore, restricts the ability of Virginia's law-
makers to regulate firearms. The alternative view, suggested by
5. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. -, -, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1168 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court for distorting Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as ar-
ticulated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980)); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (over-
ruling Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-55 (1990),
which had upheld restrictions on independent corporate political expenditures in the face
of a First Amendment challenge); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 881-82 (2007) (overruling a nearly century-old line of precedent, first articulated
in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404-06 (1911), govern-
ing vertical price restraints in antitrust law); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 562-63 (2007) (effectively overruling the forgiving pleading standard articulated in
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
6. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 & n.27 (declining to decide which level of scrutiny
is appropriate for Second Amendment challenges).
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Professor Howard in his treatise on the Virginia Constitution, is
that article I, section 13 does not impose any significant con-
straint on the General Assembly with regard to the regulation of
firearms. He suggests that article I, section 13 envisions a collec-
tive, rather than an individual, right to bear arms.
In Part I, this article will examine the original public meaning
of the Clause. This article concludes that, from its inception, arti-
cle I, section 13 was intended to, and was readily understood as,
protecting an individual right to bear arms. Such a right was in-
extricably linked in the minds of eighteenth-century Virginians,
both as a matter of lived experience and as a matter of political
theory, with a militia composed of the entire body of the people
who furnished their own arms for militia service. Part II will ex-
amine changing conditions in modern Virginia, including the cre-
ation of a National Guard funded and equipped by the national
government. These changes meant that the militia fell into dis-
use.' This led the General Assembly in 1971 to seek an amend-
ment of the language of article I, section 13 in order to preserve
the original understanding of the Clause."o
I. ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 IN COLONIAL TIMES: ORIGINAL PUBLIC
MEANING OF THE CLAUSE
Article I, section 13 was adopted in 1776 as part of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights." As originally drafted, it provided as fol-
lows:
7. 1 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 274-77
(1974) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA].
8. Id. at 277. It is worth noting that Professor Howard penned his discussion of arti-
cle I, section 13 before the Heller decision, at a time when the collective rights reading of
the Second Amendment held broader sway than it does today. Under the collective rights
view, "the Second Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests."
Heller, 554 U.S. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Therefore, under a collective rights inter-
pretation, the Second Amendment does not "limit[| any legislature's authority to regulate
private civilian uses of firearms." Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. See Michael J. Golden, The Dormant Second Amendment: Exploring the Rise, Fall,
and Potential Resurrection of Independent State Militias, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1021, 1068-69 (2013).
10. See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES PERTAINING TO THE
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 775 (1970) (statement of Del. Slaughter);
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT OF
THE CONSTITUTION 392 (1969) (statement of Sen. Barnes).
11. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XIII (1776); 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 7.
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That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people,
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free
state; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as
dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be un-
der strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.12
Surprisingly, despite the passage of nearly two-and-one-half
centuries, the Supreme Court of Virginia has never authored an
opinion construing this Clause." Moreover, constitutional debates
from the time of the adoption of the Clause in 1776 shed little
light on the original public meaning of the Clause.14 Therefore, we
must turn to other sources if we are to understand article I, sec-
tion 13.
A. Bearing Arms and the Colonial Militia
Virginians have long become accustomed to a professional mili-
tary that is equipped by the national government. In Virginia's
crucial formative years, however, colonial settlements constituted
a toehold on the edge of a vast wilderness." The colony faced con-
stant internal threats in the form of Indian raids or full scale war
against Indian tribes, as well as external threats from European
powers or from pirates.6
The colonists were left to face these dangers without any signif-
icant assistance from the Crown. "[Tihe Virginia Company did
not have the financial resources to establish a mercenary army or
any other formal, separate military organization. The company
expected its employees in America to shoulder the burden of their
own defense."" British regulars occasionally assisted the militia
when outright war broke out, but for most of the seventeenth and
12. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XIII (1776).
13. See generally Stephen P. Halbrook, Rationing Firearms Purchases and the Right
to Keep Arms: Reflections on the Bills of Rights of Virgina, West Virginia, and the United
States, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1993).
14. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 270-71, 273-
74.
15. See WILLIAM L. SHEA, THE VIRGINIA MILITIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 7
(1983); see also GEORGE PERCY, OBSERVATIONS (1607), reprinted in NARRATIVES OF EARLY
VIRGINIA 1606-1625 5, 9-10 (Lyon Gardiner Tyler ed., 1907).
16. 2 PHILIP ALEXANDER BRUCE, INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 71, 190, 203 (1910); see also SHEA, supra note 15, at 82-95.
17. SHEA, supra note 15, at 6.
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eighteenth centuries, the colony depended almost exclusively on
the militia for protection. 8
Although the colony possessed some weapons that could be dis-
tributed to the militia in the event of an emergency, a constant
and systemic shortage of weapons-mass production of weapons
would not begin until after the war for independence-meant that
the militia could not function without private arms." "The only
practical way to equip militiamen living on scattered farmsteads
in hostile country was to ensure that each had his own comple-
ment of weapons close at hand."0 Fortunately, "the requirements
for self-defense and food-gathering had put firearms in the hands
of nearly everyone."2'
The need for the militia to be self-supplied with arms prompted
legislative action at an early date in the colony's existence. In
1623, the House of Burgesses required "[tihat no man go or send
abroad without a sufficient partie will armed" and, further,
"[t]hat men go not to worke in the ground without their arms
(and a centinell upon them.)."" A few years later, in 1631, the co-
lonial legislature specified that "[a]ll men that are fittinge to
beare armes, shall bringe their peices to the church uppon payne
of every effence" and that "the comanders of all the severall plan-
tations, doe upon holy days exercise the men under his comand.""
In 1658-59, the House of Burgesses required that "every man
able to beare armes have in his house a fixt gunn two pounds of
powder and eight pound of shott."24
The importance of the militia to the colony demanded contin-
ued legislative attention even after the colony became more se-
cure. In 1748, every colonist summoned to militia duty was ex-
pected to bring with him "his arms and accoutrements," as well as
ammunition.25 The legislature also specified that persons who
18. BRUCE, supra note 16, at 3.
19. SHEA, supra note 15, at 40-44.
20. Id.
21. DANIEL J. BoORSTIN, THE AMERICANs: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 353 (1958); see
also SHEA, supra note 15, at 139 (noting the "extraordinarily widespread distribution of
firearms in the colony up to about mid-[seventeenth] century or slightly later").
22. 1 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF
ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR
1619, at 127 (1809) [hereinafter THE STATUTES AT LARGE].
23. Id. at 174.
24. Id. at 525.
25. 6 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 22, at 114.
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failed to appear with arms in response to a militia summons were
subject to a fine.21 In 1755, the House of Burgesses sought to re-
structure and improve the militia system in order to increase its
effectiveness." Subject to certain exceptions, every citizen aged
eighteen to sixty was made a member of the militia.28 Captains
and lieutenants were ordered to drill and muster at regular in-
tervals.29 Officers and soldiers were expected to appear with speci-
fied arms and powder, and were fined if they did not."o Finally,
arms were exempted from seizure by any legal process." The leg-
islature enacted another comprehensive statute regulating the
militia in 1757, again requiring militiamen to purchase their own
firearms and ammunition and making provisions for persons too
poor to do so.' 2
For the founding generation, therefore, every able-bodied
member of the political community, subject to limited exceptions,
was expected to serve in the militia, and service in the militia
meant owning a firearm and having that firearm at the ready."
The militia effectively constituted "an organization that was ac-
tually the armed population in institutional form.""
Dependence on the militia also entailed significant political
consequences:
Government in early Virginia depended on the tacit consent of the
governed, for the governed had the means to resist authority. As
long as the population was armed and the militia remained the only
effective military force in the province, and as long as direct control
of the militia remained in the hands of local authorities, rulers had
to live with the specter of revolt.
As a practical matter, the militia served as an effective check on
potential abuses by royal officials.
26. Id. at 114, 116.
27. Id. at 530-44.
28. Id. at 531.
29. Id. at 534.
30. Id. at 537-38.
31. Id. at 538.
32. 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 22, at 93-95.
33. See 6 THE STATUES AT LARGE, supra note 22, at 530-32.
34. SHEA, supra note 15, at 54.
35. Id. at 55-56.
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B. Political Theory
Bearing personal arms for service in the militia and for self-
protection was more than a practical reality for colonial Virgini-
ans. The dominant political theory of eighteenth-century America
also ascribed a key role to the militia and to the right of a citizen
to bear arms for individual and collective self-defense."
The Virginia Declaration of Rights unambiguously reflects a
theory of popular sovereignty and natural law. With respect to
popular sovereignty, clause 2 of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, currently article I, section 2 of the Virginia Constitution,
states that "all power is vested in, and consequently derived from,
the people . . . ."' As Professor Akhil Amar has pointed out, the
idea of popular sovereignty is connected with the right to keep
and bear arms.3 ' He notes, "In Locke's influential Second Treatise
of Government, the people's right to alter or abolish tyrannous
government invariably required a popular appeal to arms. To
Americans in 1789, this was not merely speculative theory. It was
the lived experience of their age.""' That was no less true in 1776,
when Virginia declared its independence from England and craft-
ed the Declaration of Rights, including article I, section 13.40
As for natural law, the first clause of our Declaration of Rights
provides:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of so-
ciety, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity;
namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquir-
ing and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety.4 1
Eighteenth-century theorists of natural law posited an inher-
ent right of self-defense. William Blackstone explained that the
36. AKHiL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 46-47
(1998).
37. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § II (1776); VA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
38. AMAR, supra note 36, at 46-49.
39. Id. at 47.
40. See VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XIII (1776); see also AMAR, supra note 36, at
47.
41. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § I (1776); VA. CONST. art. I, § 1. Remarkably, the
text of this clause has remained unchanged from 1776 through the present time. See, e.g.,
Hon. Stephen R. McCullough, A Vanishing Virginia Constitution?, 46 U. RICH. L. REV.
347, 348 & n.5 (2011).
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people of England possessed three "primary" rights.4 2 Those were
"the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and
the right of private property."a4 These three primary rights were
protected by five "auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject."" By
auxiliary rights, he meant rights whose function it was to "protect
and maintain" an Englishman's primary rights. One of these
auxiliary rights was the right "of having and using arms for self-
preservation and defence."46
The principle at the foundation of Blackstone's theory of natu-
ral rights was his contention that "the principal aim of society is
to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights,
which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature."
The primary right an individual possessed was that of "personal
security."48 Self-defense, in his view, was "the primary law of na-
ture, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law
of society."49 Similarly, Montesquieu wrote, "The life of govern-
ments is like that of men. The latter has a right to kill in case of
natural defence; the former have a right to wage war for their
own preservation."0
These views found widespread acceptance in the United States.
John Adams, for example, wrote that "Resistance to sudden vio-
lence, for the preservation not only of my person, my limbs and
life, but of my property, is an indisputable right of nature which I
have never surrendered to the public by the compact of society,
and which, perhaps, I could not surrender if I would."" Similarly,
Elbridge Gerry observed that "Self defence is a primary law of na-
ture, which no subsequent law of society can abolish."5 2 Samuel
Adams echoed these views, writing that
42. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *136.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *140.
47. Id. at *120.
48. Id. at *125.
49. 3 COMMENTARIES, supra note 42, at *4.
50. 1 CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. X, ch. 2, at 135 (Thomas
Nugent trans., 6th ed. 1792) (1748).
51. John Adams, On Private Revenge, BOS. GAZETE, Sept. 5, 1763, reprinted in 3 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 438 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1851).
52. Elbridge Gerry, Observations on the New Constitution, and on Federal and State
Conventions, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (Paul Leices-
ter Ford ed., 1888).
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[a]mong the natural rights of the Colonists are these: First, a right to
life; Secondly, to liberty; Thirdly, to property; together with the right
to support and defend them in the best manner they can. These are
evident branches of, rather than deductions from, the duty of self-
preservation, commonly called the first law of nature.
A natural right of self-defense was thought to exist not only for
individuals; it applied to society as well." Both sides of the debate
on the ratification of the United States Constitution made this
point.5 Thus, in Federalist No. 28, Alexander Hamilton wrote
that "[i]f the representatives of the people betray their constitu-
ents, there is then no recourse left but in the exertion of that orig-
inal right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms
of government."" The dissent authored by the minority of the
Pennsylvania Convention that was convened to ratify the United
States Constitution embraced an inherent right of societal self-
defense, writing that "the people have a right to bear arms for the
defence of themselves and their own state, or the United
States ... and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or
any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public
injury from individuals."
Significantly, George Mason, the drafter of the Virginia Decla-
ration of Rights," embraced this view. Mason articulated his nat-
ural law view of self-defense in the context of arguments about
the proposed congressional power over the state militia:
I consider and fear the natural propensity of rulers to oppress the
people. I wish only to prevent them from doing evil. By these
amendments, I would give necessary powers, but no unnecessary
power. If the clause stands as it is now, it will take from the State
Legislatures what Divine Providence has given to every individu-
al;-the means of self-defence.5 9
53. Samuel Adams, The Rights of the Colonists: The Report of the Committee of Corre-
spondence to the Boston Town Meeting, Nov. 20, 1772, in OLD SOUTH LEAFLETS No. 173, at
417 (Directors of the Old South Work ed. 1906), available at http://history.hanover.edu
/texts/adamss.html.
54. Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1095, 1106-07 (2000).
55. See infra notes 56-57.
56. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 176 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
57. Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention, in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS
DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 533 (Library of America ed. 1993).
58. 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 7.
59. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
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So pervasive was the view of an inherent natural right of indi-
vidual and collective self-defense that the leading constitutional
law treatises continued to advance this view long after the ratifi-
cation of the United States Constitution. Virginia jurist St.
George Tucker placed the Second Amendment in its Blackstonian
framework and noted that it stood
as the true palladium of liberty .... The right of self defence is the
first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study of rul-
ers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Wher-
ever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep
and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibit-
60
ed, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.
In another chapter, while criticizing game preservation laws
that had served as a pretext for disarming the populace of Eng-
land, Tucker added that "[i]n America we may reasonably hope
that the people will never cease to regard the right of keeping and
bearing arms as the surest pledge of their liberty."61
The militia constituted the instrument by which the people
would exert their right of self-defense. Thomas Cooley captures
this idea in his famous Commentaries:
It may be supposed from the phraseology of this provision that the
right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia; but
this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent. The mi-
litia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those persons who,
under the law, are liable to the performance of military duty, and are
officered and enrolled for service when called upon.... [I]f the right
were limited to those enrolled, the purpose of the guaranty might be
defeated altogether by the action or the neglect to act of the govern-
ment it was meant to hold in check. The meaning of the provision
undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom the militia must be tak-
en, shall have the right to keep and bear arms, and they need no
permission or regulation of law for the purpose. But this enables the
government to have a well-regulated militia; for to bear arms implies
something more than the mere keeping; it implies the learning to
handle and use them in a way that makes those who keep them
ready for their efficient use; in other words, it implies the right to
VIRGINIA 1272 (1993) (statement of George Mason (June 14, 1788)).
60. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 300 (The Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd. 1996) (1803) [hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES].
61. 3 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 61, at 414 n.3.
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meet for voluntary discipline in arms, observing in so doing the laws
62
of public order.
Likewise, Justice Story observed:
The militia is the natural defence of a free country against sudden
foreign invasions, domestic insurrections, and domestic usurpations
of power by rulers.... The right of the citizens to keep and bear
arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of
a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpa-
tion and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally ... enable the
63people to resist and triumph over them.
In fact, article I, section 3 of the Virginia Constitution express-
ly recognizes that "whenever any government shall be found in-
adequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the commu-
nity hath an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to
reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged
most conducive to the public weal."64 This provision is conceptual-
ly linked to the provisions of article I, section 13.
As a matter of political theory, then, in the minds of late eight-
eenth-century Virginians, the right to bear arms was grounded in
a natural law right of self-defense. Moreover, self-defense meant
not only protection of the individual from danger; it also meant
protection of popular sovereignty from tyrannical encroachment,
and the vehicle for that protection was the citizen militia. The
framers of article I, section 13 championed a natural right of in-
dividual and collective self-defense, and, for eighteenth-century
Virginians, the right to bear arms was an inescapable precondi-
tion of that right.
C. Virginia's Ratification of the United States Constitution
Virginia's ratification of the United States Constitution also
yields some clues concerning the original public meaning of arti-
cle I, section 13. Virginia's ratification was hardly a foregone con-
clusion. One author describes Virginia's ratification as a "cliff-
62. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 282 (Alexis C. Angell ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 2d ed.
1891).
63. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1890 (DeCapo Press 1970) (1833).
64. VA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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hanger."65 Opponents of the national Constitution like Patrick
Henry fought vigorously to defeat it."
The debate ranged widely, but of particular importance for our
purposes is the danger opponents of the national Constitution
perceived from the prospect of a standing army controlled by the
national government, combined with the subordination of the
state militia to federal control." The influential George Mason
reminded his audience of the danger of turning control of the mi-
litia over to the national government:
An instance within the memory of some of this House, will shew us
how our militia may be destroyed. Forty years ago, when the resolu-
tion of enslaving America was formed in Great-Britain, the British
Parliament was advised by an artful man, [Sir William Keith,] who
was Governor of Pennsylvania, to disarm the people.-That it was
the best and most effectual way to enslave them.-But that they
should not do it openly; but to weaken them and let them sink grad-
68
ually, by totally disusing and neglecting the militia.
Mason warned that Congress might employ the same approach if
given the opportunity: "The militia may be here destroyed by that
method which has been practised in other parts of the world be-
fore. That is, by rendering them useless, by disarming them. Un-
der various pretences, Congress may neglect to provide for arm-
ing and disciplining the militia."" Likewise, Patrick Henry
denounced the power of Congress over the state militias, arguing,
"The militia, Sir, is our ultimate safety. We can have no security
without it."'o Henry articulated the prevailing understanding that
[tihe great object is, that every man be armed.... Every one who is
able may have a gun.... When this power [to arm the militia] is giv-
en up to Congress without limitation or bounds, how will your mili-
tia be armed? You trust to chance; for sure I am, that that nation
which shall trust its liberties in other hands, cannot long exist."
65. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 395 (2009).
66. Id. at 396.
67. See 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 59, at 1271 (statement of George Mason (June 13, 1788)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1270.
70. Id. at 1276 (statement of Patrick Henry (June 14, 1788)).
71. Id.
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Thanks in large part to the efforts of James Madison, the Vir-
ginia convention narrowly voted in favor of ratification. Virginia,
however, also urged Congress to adopt a Bill of Rights. 73 Among
the rights Virginia asked Congress to enshrine in a Bill of Rights
was the following:
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms: that a well regu-
lated militia composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is
the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State. That standing
armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought
to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the
community will admit; and that in all cases, the military should be
74
under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power.
Although the amendment proposed by Virginia is very similar
to the original draft of article I, section 13, as a reaction to Pat-
rick Henry and George Mason's warnings, the Virginia conven-
tion added the phrase, "the people have a right to keep and bear
arms."" That insertion should not come as a surprise. For more
than a century, militia service for all classes of Virginians was
synonymous with and inseparable from an individual right to
keep and bear a firearm.
By 1776, for more than a century and for a broad swath of Vir-
ginia's male population, militia service had meant reporting for
duty with one's own firearm. This historical understanding, com-
bined with the dominant political theory of the time, leads to the
firm conclusion that article I, section 13 was included in the Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights for two overlapping purposes: (1) to
protect an individual's natural right to self-defense, and (2) by do-
ing so, to enable society to engage in its inalienable right of collec-
tive self-defense against tyrannical encroachment via an armed
militia.
72. BEEMAN, supra note 66, at 395-96, 400.
73. Id. at 399.
74. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, su-
pra note 59, at 1553.
75. Id.
76. The Militia Act of 1792 enacted by the United States Congress also reflects a link
that would have existed in the minds of the founding generation between militia service
and an armed citizenry. That statute enrolled every "able-bodied white male citizen," be-
tween the ages of eighteen and forty-five, in the militia, and directed members of the mili-
tia to equip themselves with, among other things, "a good musket or firelock" for service in
the militia. See Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792) (repealed 1903).
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II. ARTICLE I, SECTION 13 IN MODERN VIRGINIA: CHANGING
CONDITIONS AND PRESERVING ORIGINAL INTENT
Over time, several factors combined to eclipse the military
function of the colonial militia and to erase the firm link that
would have existed in the minds of eighteenth-century Virginians
between militia service and an individual right to bear arms.
These factors include congressional reform of the National Guard
system, which resulted in a National Guard equipped and funded
by the national government," the unsuitability of a traditional
militia to deal with the types of internal and external threats
faced by the nation, and, not least, the institution of a republican
form of government which is accountable to the people.
A. Calling up the Militia
The use of the militia during World War II illustrates the fun-
damental change that had occurred between the militia of coloni-
al times and modern application of the concept. Following the
mobilization of the National Guard during World War II, Virginia
Governor James H. Price invoked his statutory authority, rooted
in article I, section 13, to organize a new militia force that became
known as the Virginia Protective Force." This force supported the
war effort by, among other things, protecting industrial and mili-
tary facilities and standing by to assist the population in the
event of an emergency." A large number of Virginians-over
400,000-enrolled in the Virginia Protective Force, freely giving
their time to help protect Virginia.o Weapons for this force, how-
ever, were provided by the War Department."
A creative invocation of article I, section 13 came in the winter
of 1946, when Governor William M. Tuck invoked the Clause in a
labor dispute between Virginia Electric and Power Company
("VEPCO") and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
77. See generally Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 340-46 (1990) (describing con-
gressional reform of the National Guard).
78. MARVIN WILSON SCHLEGEL, VIRGINIA ON GUARD: CIVILIAN DEFENSE AND THE
STATE MILITIA IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 35-36 (1949).
79. Id. at 35.
80. Id. at 249-51.
81. Id. at 38.
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ers. 2 At that time, VEPCO served more than half of the Virginia
population. Initially, the strike threat did not attract much no-
tice.84 With no resolution in sight and the threatened strike a
mere ten days away, Governor Tuck faced the prospect of shut-
tered schools and hospitals, as well as catastrophic loss to Virgin-
ia's economy.
To address the looming crisis, Governor Tuck announced a bold
plan rooted in three sources of authority: first, a state law re-
quired VEPCO to provide continuous service to its customers;
second, his authority to call the unorganized militia into service;
and third, the longstanding statute that made all able-bodied
males between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five members of the
unorganized militia.86 Tuck ordered uniformed members of the
Virginia State Guard, still in service following the end of World
War II, to distribute the following notice to employees of
VEPCO:87
You are hereby notified that you have been drafted by the command-
er-in-chief of the land and naval forces of Virginia, the Honorable
William M. Tuck, Governor of Virginia, into the service of the Com-
monwealth to execute the law which requires the Virginia Electric
and Power Company to provide electric service to the people of Vir-
. . 88gnia.
The newly drafted militiamen were informed in a second order
issued by the Governor that they would be 'granted a temporary
suspension of .. . active military duties so long as the Virginia
Electric and Power Company is conducting operations without in-
terruption by strike."'" In the event of a strike, the inactive status
of VEPCO workers would be revoked and they would be ordered
to continue operating the power plants as members of the state
militia."0 If they refused to do so, the VEPCO employee/militia
members would be 'subject to the military law of Virginia, and
82. Id. at 247-48.
83. William Bryan Crawley, Jr., The Governorship of William M. Tuck, 1946-1950:
Virginia Politics in the "Golden Age" of the Byrd Organization 217-18 (1974) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file at the Library of Virginia).
84. Id. at 219.
85. Id. at 219-21.
86. Id. at 229-30.
87. Id. at 227-28.
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for disobedience to orders or other offenses against said law ...
are subject to such lawful punishment as a court martial may di-
rect.""' Happily, VEPCO and the union reached an agreement
and, therefore, the "militiamen" were never actually pressed into
active duty-and the legality of Governor Tuck's plan was never
tested.92 This invocation of the militia power bore little resem-
blance to the use of the colonial militia.
These two examples show how far the modern uses of the mili-
tia had evolved from the self-equipped militiaman of colonial
times. In the popular mind, the indispensable link, so obvious to
the founding generation, between militia service and a right to
bear arms had become lost.
B. The Constitutional Revision of 1971
Article I, section 13 was amended in 1971 as part of a compre-
hensive revision of the Virginia Constitution." The committee es-
tablished to revise the constitution did not propose any changes
to article I, section 13.9 The House of Delegates, however, sug-
gested additional language." Specifically, the House of Delegates
proposed that the phrase "therefore, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed" be added to the Con-
stitution, as follows:
That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people,
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free
state, therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be
avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military
should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil
96power.
The purpose of this change, constitutional debates reveal, was
to align the Virginia Constitution with an individual rights read-
91. Id. at 228-29.
92. Id. at 238. The Attorney General, however, issued an official opinion upholding
the legality of the governor's actions. 1946 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 144, 146.
93. See generally THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (1969).
94. Id. at 98.
95. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 10, at 818-
19.
96. Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
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ing of the Second Amendment." The Senate debate specifically
referenced a 1964 joint legislative resolution embracing an indi-
vidual right to bear arms." The key passage of this resolution
provides:
[Tihe right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the second amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States and which right is an
inalienable part of our citizens' heritage in this State shall not be in-
fringed; that any action taken by the General Assembly of Virginia
to interfere with this right would strike at the basic liberty of our cit-
izens; that no agency of this State or of any political subdivision
should be given any power or seek any power which would prohibit
the purchase or possession of firearms by any citizen of good stand-
ing for the purpose of personal defense, sport, recreation or other
non-criminal activities; and that registration of arms, for which reg-
istration is not presently required, not be required, by legislative ac-
tion of this body.99
Opposition to the amendment advanced a collective rights the-
ory of the Clause. Senator Howell argued that article I, section 13
represents
a military guarantee in our Constitution, a guarantee that we shall
have hometown soldiers that can be rendezvoused under a system of
command that I think is adequate. No one thinks there is anything
wrong with the Guardsmen ....
The militia is happy, the soldiers are happy, we are at peace with the
soldiers, the soldiers are at peace with us. And what I want to see on
page 98 of the revisors' report, that the source of Section 13 is the
present Section 13; "Comment: No change."100
The amendment to add the language "therefore, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed" was adopted
in the Senate by a vote of thirty-one in favor to one opposed-a
decisive rejection of the collective rights theory by the Senate of
Virginia.'0'
During both the House and the Senate debates on the amend-
ment to article I, section 13, legislators questioning this change
97. Id. at 775 (statement of Del. Slaughter); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
SENATE, supra note 10, at 392 (statement of Sens. Barnes & Bateman).
98. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE, supra note 10, at 391-92 (statement
of Sen. Barnes).
99. H.J. Res. 21, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1964).
100. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE, supra note 10, at 394 (statement of
Sen. Howell).
101. Id. (statement of Pres. Pollard).
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received assurances by proponents of the change that the added
language would not impede the ability of the General Assembly to
enact "reasonable" legislation with regard to firearms, and fur-
ther, that the change would not threaten then existing gun legis-
lation.02
The 1971 amendment to the language of article I, section 13
represents a reaffirmation of the original conception of the Clause
as protecting an individual right to bear arms.
C. A Further Amendment Strengthens the Individual Rights
Interpretation
Article XI, section 4, adopted in 2001, protects a right to hunt,
"subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General As-
sembly may prescribe by general law."' From the earliest days of
the Virginia Colony, hunting has been associated with firearms.'
Although article XI, section 4 expressly grants the General As-
sembly latitude to regulate and restrict hunting, a right to hunt
without being able to possess and transport firearms outside the
home would be largely devoid of meaning. Therefore, while article
XI, section 4 does not serve as the principal rationale for an indi-
vidual right to bear arms, it does strengthen the existing individ-
ual right, recognized by article I, section 13, to keep and bear
arms.
III. THE MILITIA LIVES ON
Virginians-men and women-may be surprised to learn that,
with limited exceptions, they are, as a matter of law, members of
the unorganized militia. Consistent with article I, section 13,
which provides that the militia is "composed of the body of the
people," current Virginia Code section 44-1 provides that
102. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 10, at 473
(statement of Dels. Galland & Harrell); PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE, supra
note 10, at 392-94 (statements of Sens. Barnes, Bateman, & Long).
103. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
104. BRUCE, supra note 16, at 62 (noting that "from the time [a colonial Virginian in
the seventeenth century] could shoulder a fowling piece he had been in the habit of using
firearms" and would have acquired "at an early age ... all the skill of a practised marks-
man.").
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[tihe militia of the Commonwealth of Virginia shall consist of all
able-bodied residents of the Commonwealth who are citizens of the
United States and all other able-bodied persons resident in the
Commonwealth who have declared their intention to become citizens
of the United States, who are at least 16 years of afe and, except as
hereinafter provided, not more than 55 years of age.
The same Virginia Code section divides the militia into four
classes: the National Guard, the Virginia State Defense Force,
the naval militia, and the unorganized militia.106 The "unor-
ganized militia" consists of "all able-bodied persons as set out in
section 44-1" except those serving in the National Guard, the na-
val militia and others who are exempt."o
The Governor has express statutory authority to call out the
militia, in whole or in part, "at any time, in order to execute the
law, suppress riots or insurrections, or repel invasion, or aid in
any form of disaster wherein the lives or property of citizens are
imperiled or may be imperiled."o' These statutes, which presently
rest in tranquil hibernation in the Virginia Code, represent a di-
rect historical legacy from the turbulent early days of our Com-
monwealth.
CONCLUSION
Virginia no longer calls upon her citizens to muster for militia
duty. Nevertheless, article I, section 13 remains significant be-
cause it enshrines in the Virginia Constitution an individual right
to keep and bear firearms. That article I, section 13 was designed
to protect an individual right rather than a collective right is
manifest from the historical context of its adoption and the origi-
nal public meaning that the founding generation would have at-
tributed to the Clause. The debate surrounding the amendment
to the Clause in 1971 only strengthens the conclusion that the
Clause protects an individual right to keep and bear arms. Alt-
hough the General Assembly can enact sensible gun control
measures, the individual right to keep and bear a gun embodied
in article I, section 13 imposes meaningful constraints on the
power of the General Assembly to restrict the right of law-abiding
citizens to keep and bear firearms.
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-1 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 44-4 (Repl. Vol. 2013). For a list of persons exempt from militia service, see
id. § 44-5 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
108. Id. § 44-86 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
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